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Farley: Transcript: Comments on Panel 1

COMMENTS ON PANEL 1
CHRISTINE FARLEY
I am extremely grateful to both of these speakers for sharing these papers
with us. The papers themselves are beautifully written. I had immense joy
in reading them, and I am very happy they are part of this conference. I
want to congratulate both of you for doing such big projects in a short
amount of space and synthesizing so much work, and interdisciplinary
work at that. I am going to attempt to say a few things that might put the
papers “in dialogue.”
In a sense, both papers talk about dualisms. Most obviously, Dan’s
paper examines the mind/body dualism. Carys’s paper also involved a
dualism: the origination/imitation dualism, if you will. Each paper reminds
us that these dualisms, or paradigms, do not map onto reality very well.
Instead, these paradigms mask reality and produce some negative effects.
One effect is an inaccurate distribution of rights. Perhaps we saw that most
clearly in Dan’s paper. These dualisms cause us to devalue feminized
traits. In the IP context that means that they cause us to incorrectly value
the labor and the production of creating works, as well as the works,
inventions, and discoveries themselves. In fact, these dualisms may not
even have the desired effect of incentivizing behaviors that we would like
to incentivize through the intellectual property system (i.e., the progress of
the arts and sciences). These insights are important contributions to a
feminist study of intellectual property.
Nevertheless, I wonder about the project of deconstructing these
paradigms and where that leads us. If we deconstruct the mind/body
dualism and the authorship construct, what would be the result? What
would happen if the law recognized what Dan terms “invisible work”?
What would be the practical effect of rendering this work legally visible?
Wouldn’t we have more patents issued? Would this be a good thing for
competition? Carys acknowledged this a little bit in her paper when she
said, “this deconstruction might lead to the demise of the copyright
system,” which she thought may not be a good thing. But both of these
papers recognized that these paradigms offer us a convenient ruse. They
offer the intellectual property system a ruse for the location and assignment
of rights and for the requirements of the creation of rights. And they also
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remind us that these paradigms have really taken hold. They seem to have
intuitive appeal, and they seem to outlast any critique.
These papers caused me to recall a recent visit to the Museum of the
American Indian where I saw a performance of tribal song and dance.
Through the introductions to these performances, we were informed that
the songs and dances were very traditional and that they were being
performed according to the traditional rules. But at the end, each song was
credited in a way that was surprising to me. Some young person would be
pointed out as the “owner” of the song. I wondered how these songs could
both be so traditional and authentic and also have their ownership assigned
to an individual, and a young one at that. I wonder now, given what we
have heard from these papers today, whether that “owner” may have
discovered the songs. Or perhaps the owner was in dialogue with them. Or
maybe the owner made the songs concrete if they had previously been in
the mind only. In other words, this ownership system may represent an
alternative imagined in these papers. Perhaps it offers the kind of practical
assignment of rights without maintaining the traditional ownership
paradigm.
The speakers demonstrate for us that feminist theory can make important
contributions to the field of intellectual property and have thus earned their
airfare here in doing that today. Feminist theory allows us to acknowledge
this ruse for what it is, and thereby allows us to expose its detrimental
effects and to offer alternative solutions. Dichotomies are attractive
because of the simplistic truths they seem to offer. But in their simplicity
they do not always work so well. These dualisms and constructs are
therefore not constant in the development of IP law. We see, and there are
examples of this in both of the papers, where these dualisms and constructs
have ebbs and flows. They come on very strongly at some points and they
conveniently recede at others. It is at these moments where these
paradigms emerge and disappear that they are really doing their work. And
it is at these points that we have an opportunity to offer alternatives that we
can take from feminist theory.
I want to thank these speakers for the hope that they have given us for
this project in intellectual property. It has been a great start for this
conference because they have given us a real foundation for this feminist
project. I want to again acknowledge the great contribution from these
speakers. Thank you.
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